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The claim is made in this paper that the discourse of education offers a challenge to
evidence-based practices because this latter approach is embedded in the discourse of
management. Although claiming the status of being ‘scientific’, this latter development
is drawn upon problematically by policy makers to provide the warrant for stipulating
rules and procedures for ‘best practices’ to which educators are being held accountable.
This paper shall draw mostly upon Dewey and is structured into three sections. The
first section will attempt to explain the flaw in this evidence-based approach by providing
a comparison between empiricism and science. Second, a review of Dewey’s recom-
mendation for educators to become more scientific in attitude will then follow, leading
to the final section, in which the case will be made that educational practice needs to
become as scientific, philosophical and democratic as possible in order for educators to
resist being de-professionalised.
Keywords: best practice; Dewey; educational; empirical; evidence-based; professional
Introduction
There is increasing emphasis being given to evidence-based practices for teacher education,
educational policy, school leadership and teaching generally. Evidence-based practices,
although clearly present throughout educational research, are also clearly embedded in the
discourse of management. This discourse is described by Pring (2004a, pp. 204–205) as
primarily involving ‘improvement’, ‘raising standards’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘what works’.
The major concern driving it is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of institutional
operations in order to enable resources – both human and material – to be used most eco-
nomically. Although what counts as ‘evidence’ can be unclear and even contentious at
times, Elliot (2001, p. 559) recognises that what is often promoted as scientific evidence
actually functions as a masquerade for bureaucrats who are seeking greater social control.
As educators we are not considered by many managers and politicians to be as efficient
when involved in our own inquiries compared with simply applying standardised and
‘best practices’ that ‘work’, as recognised through some evidence-based studies.
I am not suggesting, however, that as educators we should be opposed to evidence.
Davies (1999) claims that education should become more evidence based to enhance our
policies and practices and that this should be promoted in order to bridge the gap that, too
often, occurs between teaching and researching. Groundwater-Smith and Dadds (2004,
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D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
4:
38
 2
 J
un
e 
20
11
216 R.S. Webster
p. 239) add that an important source to include in evidence-based practice ought to be gen-
erated by teachers themselves and that the value of such evidence should be to enhance
‘the important practical and moral judg[e]ments’ that must occur within schools to
improve their value to communities. Elliot (2007, pp. 165–166) similarly argues that
evidence-based practices should be accompanied by the ongoing professional develop-
ment of teachers who must make educative and moral judgements that are context specific
rather than have them dictated by ‘standards-driven reform . . . which ignores [the] com-
plexity and views the ideal learning environment as a simple, stable, linear system that
behaves in quite predictable ways’. Along with Elliot (2001) and MacIntyre (1984), we
can observe that much of the so-called scientific-based research evidence behind the pro-
motion of certain social practices operate to reduce the need for professional judgement
making by educators, whose work has become ever more controlled by politicians and
bureaucrats. When departments of education establish their own set of ‘best practices’,
apparently with the warrant of ‘evidence’, this provides them with criteria by which
accountability and performativity of teachers might be monitored.
The aim of this paper is to challenge this phenomenon of evidence-based practices that
is particularly embedded in the discourse of management and neglects the sort of evidence-
based research and practices required to enhance the professionalism of teachers. The
importance of such a contribution is partly recognised through Elliot’s claim that:
What is lacking in the contemporary discourse about the future direction and practical utility
of educational research is any consideration of the contribution of educational and curriculum
theory to conceptualising its aims and processes. The current discourse is uninformed by any
theory about the nature of educational practice . . . (Elliot, 2001, p. 572)
In order to contribute to the theoretical dimension of education to which Elliot refers, I
shall primarily be using a Deweyan approach. In addition, I shall also supplement this
with some material from the more analytical tradition. This is because the discourse of
education is, according to both John Dewey and Richard Peters, primarily evaluative, per-
taining to what is worthwhile and morally good, engaging in political understandings ori-
ented to maintaining what is valuable in a civilisation while making possible innovations
that will enable changes and improvements to be made. More recently, Carr (2003) and
Pring (2004b) have argued that the ‘groundfloor conceptual considerations’ and the
‘logic’ of the discourse of education clearly involve understandings of teaching, learning,
personhood and worthwhileness concurrently. Not all teaching and learning experiences
are educative, even if listed as involving ‘best practices’. Criteria must be available for us
to base judgements upon to enable us to discriminate between specific sorts of teaching
and learning practices which might offer educative value and those which might not.
These criteria could involve those recommended by Dewey, such as thinking, growth,
continuity and interaction, and the avoidance of narrowing or arresting growth. The
transformation of the learner through particular experiences must lead in some way to a
change for the ‘better’ or to a way-of-being that is more worthwhile. These notions of
becoming better and more worthwhile do not appeal to universal notions of what are
agreed to be ‘good’ but they must involve the serious commitment of each educator to a
clearer sense of what s/he understands to be of value for particular students and for soci-
ety as a whole. This inescapably evaluative aspect of education was recognised by
Dewey, who claimed that all of an educator’s judgements involve how s/he values;
hence, every education is a moral education. Educative value cannot be reduced to some
particular sense of ‘good’ that is universal to education but, rather, involves the value
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judgements made by each and every educator regarding what might be worthwhile for
each student to experience.
This intrinsic aspect to the discourse of education offers an important challenge to the
evidence-based practices approaches of management that we need to recognise and enact
upon if we are to continue to educate. According to Davies (1999, pp. 116–117) ‘best
practices in . . . education . . . involves integrating such knowledge with professional
judgement and experience’. However, Groundwater-Smith and Dadds (2004, p. 250)
argue that, unfortunately, we have been beset by this standards-driven notion of ‘best
practices’ as if it were the ‘holy grail’. To assist in enhancing our capacity for making
judgements that incorporate evidence and are able to educate, this paper will first provide a
comparison between empiricism and science before reviewing Dewey’s recommendation
that educators ought to become more scientific and philosophical, while actively resisting
the influences of managing elites who seek to promote practices based upon unfounded
dogma. The final section will relate such a way-of-being to the importance of democracy
in order for educational practice to be both professional and educative.
A problem with evidence-based approaches: Empirical but not scientific
As mentioned in the introduction, evidence-based approaches, in addition to helping
inform the professional judgements of educators, are also embedded in the discourse of
management. These approaches in management discourse seek to identify and implement
efficiencies. This, of course, is appropriate for bureaucrats who are employed and are
accountable for maximising limited public resources to give most value to the community.
Thus, politicians in particular are clearly disposed to adopting such a perspective. For
example, the Australian Federal Minister for Education, Julia Gillard (2008), has stated
that her government’s National Action Plan is aimed upon funding ‘an evidence-based
approach’. This is not a particularly ‘bad’ perspective to employ on occasions and we are
certainly grateful to our politicians who strive to provide good economic value for public
monies. None of us would seriously argue against policy decisions being based upon rig-
orous research into ‘what works’ and drawing upon an appropriate body of ‘evidence’.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that ‘evidence’ is not the same thing as
‘proof’ (Pring, 2004a, p. 198). This has important implications for evidence-based
approaches that are conducted in order to inform policies in the field of education such as,
for example, what are the best teaching approaches to use in teacher education classes?
Research in education is often empirical in nature but is very rarely scientific. However,
empirical research is often persuasively communicated to educators and to the public at
large that it is, in fact, ‘scientific’. For example, according to Slavin (2007), in the No
Child Left Behind Policy in the United States, the phrase ‘scientifically based research’ is
mentioned 110 times and, yet, no truly scientific research has been conducted regarding
proven approaches that can cause learners to learn. I consider this to be such an important
point to recognise that as educators we would do well to remind ourselves of the differ-
ence between empiricism and science in order not to be deceived by pseudoscientific
claims in education that can be used to prevent us, as professionals, from continuing to
critically engage in the debates surrounding the evidence-base of what works. In order to
see through the problematic nature of the presumed value-neutral and political-neutral
‘evidence’, we must remind ourselves how proper scientific investigations differ from
mere empirical ones.
As a pragmatist, John Dewey was concerned with ‘what works’ and he was a clear
supporter of science. In addition to being clearly familiar with the scientific approach,
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Dewey was also embedded in the discourse of education. Despite a great deal of research
in education even in his day, he argued that ‘nothing has brought pedagogical theory into
greater disrepute than the belief that it is identified with handing out to teachers recipes
and models to be followed in teaching’ (Dewey, 1916, pp. 176–177). He was quite clearly
against any approaches that adopt the notion of applying ‘best practices’ in order to cause
learning in students. And, yet, we witness many government sites in Australia clearly sup-
porting such a recipe and model approach, as demonstrated through such programs as
Victoria’s Principles of Learning and Teaching, which is provided in order to ‘train’ (note –
not educate but only train) teachers. In order to be able to appreciate Dewey’s position
about bringing pedagogical theory into such disrepute through such programs, we need to
be clear about the differences between empiricism and science and remind ourselves of
the nature of the discourse of education itself.
Dewey (1916, p. 233) understood that ‘the word empirical in its ordinary use does not
mean “connected with experiment”, but rather crude and unrational . . . Empirical knowledge
meant the knowledge accumulated by a multitude of past instances without intelligent
insight into the principles of any of them’. Empiricism cannot demonstrate any cause and
effect relationships but only builds upon placing confidence in the significance of certain
correlations that have been collected over a period of time. The inability of empiricism to
demonstrate an intelligent inquiry into potential cause–effect relations has been described
by Bertrand Russell – a contemporary of Dewey. He gave the example of a hen in a
chicken coop who observed every morning that the farmer’s wife came out the kitchen
door and walked over to provide food for the hen. The consistency and predictability of
such observations over a period of time provides the hen with the empirical evidence-base
that enables it to conclude that each morning the farmer’s wife will continue to provide
food for her. This apparent conclusion could be validated each subsequent morning that
this same event occurs. However, being empirical, this research by the hen cannot be
experimental nor is she able to determine whether she has made the right conclusion or
not. Her predictions might continue to be validated for a long time – at least until the one
single occasion when the farmer’s wife approaches the coop with an axe in her hand.
Evidence that is empirical only, relying upon observations and correlations within
respectable degrees of confidence, may be presented in pseudo-scientific terminologies
but is unable to demonstrate any cause–effect relationships. Importantly, when advanced
even with the accompaniment of authoritative accolades to be ‘evidence of what works’,
empiricism can be used to suppress critical, intellectual inquiry and scientific experimen-
tation because often it is contended to offer irrefutable proof. Dewey (1916, p. 233) has
warned us that the promotion of any evidence based only upon empiricism can forbid
‘constructive applications of intelligence; it depends upon following in an imitative slavish
manner the models set in the past’. Thus, we can see his concern for bringing pedagogi-
cal theory into disrepute by prescribing recipes and models to be followed for early
career teachers. Just because certain teaching activities appear to be related to certain
learning outcomes, we must give careful consideration to any suggestion that there is an
actual cause and effect relation between the two events. Indeed, Fenstermacher (1978,
1986) encourages us to seriously question the relations we often assume to exist between
teaching and learning, as he contends that too much is often taken for granted in this
regard.
Much of our tacit understandings regarding teaching and learning are based upon our
own experiences of what tends to ‘work’; that is, as practising teachers we tend to employ
the approaches that appear to have had repeated success for us personally in the past. Our
tacit understandings which inform our practices tend to be heavily influenced by only
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empirical-based evidence. Indeed, empiricism often appeals to ‘common sense’. However,
Dewey was against adopting such an approach, concluding that:
The disadvantages of purely empirical thinking are obvious. Attention may be called to three
of them: (1) its tendency to lead to false beliefs, (2) its inability to cope with the novel; and (3)
its tendency to engender mental inertia and dogmatism. (Dewey, 1933, p. 269)
This last point can lead educators (and the public) to become easily manipulated by
bureaucratic policy makers who promote the application of particular ‘best practices’.
These policy makers are encouraging teaching to take on a technical role, one that applies
these standardised approved practices based solely on the rationale ‘because they work’.
Teachers and teacher educators are not being invited to be co-researchers working in the
very discourse of education, inquiring into what approaches might offer the most educa-
tive value for particular learners in particular circumstances. Our community is being
encouraged, through evidence-based policy, not to share expertise through an invitation to
critically inquire into possible policy initiatives but, rather, we are to adopt a top–down
structure to our community in which, rather than be critical inquirers, we teachers are
encouraged to comply with empirically evidence-based policies as if they were irrefutable.
As Dewey (1933, p. 271) revealed, ‘They give rise to doctrines that, inculcated and
handed down, become dogmas; subsequent inquiry and reflection are actually stifled.’
This is made possible by the illogical yet subtle and manipulative slide from the identifica-
tion of a result or even the establishment of a fact from observation but then extrapolating
a rule, law or procedure that must be applied universally. Elliot and Lukeš (2008, p. 97)
also claim that this ‘tendency to use findings from [sample] studies as a basis for prescribing
educational action and marginalising professional judgement in the process cannot be
warranted by any defensible theory of knowledge’.
Being scientific
Evidence-based practices thath rely exclusively upon empirical approaches are not only
limited and can lead to false beliefs but they can actually stifle intellectual inquiry. In con-
trast, scientific inquiries involve active and critical testing and experimentation and can
encourage teachers as educators to become more intellectual. The sort of intellectual
development that Dewey was most concerned with was social intelligence. This is because
with his vision of making the world a better place social change was to occur. Such
change, he argued, is possible only through social intelligence. In order to enhance such
intelligence he argued that the scientific approach to research ‘replaces the repeated con-
junction or coincidence of separate facts by discovery of a single comprehensive fact’ in
order to seek out in detail the various cause–effect relations that contribute to it (Dewey,
1933, p. 273). His notion of social intelligence based upon scientific inquiry also involves
ethical considerations (Webster, 2008) as the ends, purposes or ends-in-view are necessar-
ily involved. This scientific attitude that was so central for Dewey is far superior to empir-
icism because it involves active experimentation upon suggested relations rather than
finding the strengths of correlations, and being based upon the scientific community it also
involves an invitation for all to be involved in testing possible cause and effect relation-
ships. As such, it is an ongoing act, a way of life rather than an accumulation of a body of
results, information or knowledge.
Through the many advantages associated with the scientific attitude, Dewey (1933,
p. 273) specifically argued that it is the reasoning associated with experimentation that is
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the key characteristic to its usefulness. Thus, experimentation is the fundamental differ-
ence between empiricism and science. Although both empiricism and science are embed-
ded in experiences, only science involves active, critical, intelligent testing and
experimenting of hypotheses that attempt to offer cause and effect relationships. Dewey
summed up this major difference by stating that:
The empirical method inevitably magnifies the influences of the past; the experimental
method throws into relief the possibilities of the future. The empirical method says, ‘Wait till
there is a sufficient number of cases’; the experimental method says, ‘Produce the cases.’
(Dewey 1933, p. 275)
Conclusions that are offered from current evidence-based research are drawn only
from empirical means. However, such conclusions are formulated without experimental
rigour and, consequently, may lead to false beliefs, a failure to account for the novel and
intellectual laziness to continue to question and inquire, as Dewey has argued. He clearly
identified that ‘the empirical method offers no way of discriminating between right and
wrong conclusions’ (Dewey, 1933, p. 270). Recognising this important difference between
empiricism and science can enable us to appreciate Pring’s insights, which he makes
regarding the current demand for evidence-based policies and practices. He concludes that
there is:
1. the logical unpredictability of all the consequences of a particular course of action
or a particular policy
2. the irreconcilability of scientific discourse (and thus the social sciences within a
particular tradition) with that concerned with persons
3. the logical separation of educational ‘ends’ or ‘goals’ from the ‘means’ of achieving
them. (Pring, 2004a, p. 199)
His points listed here should make clear for us all that the empirical approach can collect
only historical accounts. It is unable to predict or cause specific outcomes in unfamiliar
and complex environments, especially those involving human persons, who are much too
complex to have their emotions, desires and habits ‘controlled’ by scientific experimenta-
tion that assumes a closed system in an effort to discover how learners learn. This is
because as intentional beings there also ought to be consideration given to why learners
might want to learn.
Although Pring clearly claims that scientific discourse is unsuitable for fully under-
standing the complexities of persons, Dewey encouraged the incorporation of a scientific
attitude for practising educators. To make his case he clearly stated that he understood
‘science’ to have a wide range of meanings in order to avoid any positivistic assumptions
being imputed to it, thereby restricting its usefulness only to the study of inanimate
objects. For Dewey, science basically can be described as a systematic method of inquiry.
In order to promote educative value he argued that the way-of-being of educators ought to
become more scientific. He was, however, vehemently against any moves to introduce
policies that are assumedly based upon rigorous and scientific evidence in order to pro-
duce rules and regulations for which teachers are to passively and obediently apply as if
these were dogma. He claimed that:
When, in education, the psychologist or observer and experimentalist in any field reduces his
findings to a rule which is to be uniformly adopted, then, only, is there a result which is objec-
tionable and destructive of the free play of education as an art. (Dewey, 1929, p. 6)
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Dewey understood that education was more of an art than a science, and yet he con-
tended that it is most valuable for us as teachers to be scientific in order to make our teaching
art as intelligent as possible. This requires teachers to exercise experimental inquiry as a
community of professional educators, rather than become reduced to being the deliverers
of someone else’s ‘best practices’ developed on empirical evidence gained in a different
context and time to our own environments for which we are responsible. He argued that:
In its empirical form the chief factors determining education are tradition [and] imitative
reproduction . . . [I]n this situation there is a strong tendency to identify teaching ability with
the use of procedures that yield immediately successful results, success being measured by
such things as order in the class-room, correct recitations by pupils in assigned lessons, passing
of examinations, promotion of pupils to a higher grade, etc. (Dewey, 1929, p. 7)
Like Deborah Britzman’s (2003) more recent study in her Practice Makes Practice, in
which she recognises pre-service teachers wanting a formula for what works in teaching,
Dewey, too, recognised in his own time that prospective teachers ‘want very largely to
find out how to do things with the maximum prospect of success. To put baldly, they want
recipes.’ Compliance with this desire he contended, as was mentioned earlier, brings ‘ped-
agogical theory into disrepute’. In contrast, he argued that such prospective teachers
should become more scientific because a scientific attitude is able to offer itself as ‘an
organ of personal illumination and liberation’ (Dewey, 1929, p. 7).
It is at this point we can better appreciate the importance of Dewey’s view. He clearly
recognised that no evidence-based result, whether fact or conclusion, can slide into
becoming converted into a rule, law or ‘best practice’ to be compliantly copied and imple-
mented by teachers. There is no ‘silver-bullet’ formula for teaching which can cause
learners to behave and learn well universally. Indeed, he warned us against succumbing to
the ‘the pressure to demonstrate immediate utility in school administration and instruction’
because such a move ‘is dangerous’ (Dewey, 1929, p. 11).
Currently, the manner in which evidence-based practices are being imposed upon edu-
cators removes us from being equal and professional partners who research into education.
We are being manipulated by policies that compel us to be technical appliers of authorita-
tive procedures. Reducing the professional status of educators through such an approach is
in contrast to true scientific communities, who are very horizontal in their structure. Any-
one is at liberty to offer to the community a hypothesis. All community members are then
invited to critique, test and experiment this, seeking to demonstrate occasions for the null
hypothesis or seek what Popper referred to as its falsification. Dewey recognised that such
a community must be necessarily democratic in its practices as all members are freely able
to inquire into and test the assertions of all the other members of the group. This important
concept of democracy he describes as follows:
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living,
of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals
who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to
consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking
down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory [that] kept men from perceiving
the full import of their activity. (Dewey, 1916, p. 93)
Recently, Waks (2007, pp. 34–35) recognised that this democratic view demonstrating
‘Dewey’s Cosmopolitan global standpoint’ is most valuable for us today in order to take
‘us past a major impasse in educational theory’, which is experiencing a tension between
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nationalistic trends (such as the development of a national curriculum for Australia) and
the need to transcend nationalistic self-interests in order to pursue global understandings,
cooperation and partnerships. Not only is this democratic ideal important for maintaining
the professionalism of educators, it is also necessary if humanity is to progress towards
global sustainability and peace.
Maintaining a sense of democracy for education
In his contribution to UNESCO’s symposium on democracy, Dewey (1951) warned that
the very success of UNESCO depended upon our own individual commitments to the
common, cosmic good through the exercising of the freedom to inquire into all aspects of
social practices. In his essay given to this symposium, he stated that he was very much
against communism and, indeed, all forms of totalitarianism and authoritarianism that
work against democratic freedom. Before this occasion he was already very clear that he
saw ‘no way fundamentally in the long run to meet the claims of authoritarianism of dif-
ferent forms, excepting in the development of scientific method’ because this offered an ideal
‘protection against dogmatism’ (Dewey, 1937, p. 443). He considered the neo-conservative
and neo-liberal forces of his time which promoted the self-interests of nation-states and
corporations as being actively involved in the maintenance of the status quo – especially
using schooling for such purposes. He argued that ‘against this danger, an experimental
philosophy stands in firm alliance with the methods by which the natural sciences arrive at
warranted truths’ (Dewey, 1938a, p. 282).
Resisting the forces that seek to divide humankind from the environment and from
each other, Dewey argued that we seek to enlighten our social intelligence through the
use of both a scientific attitude and a philosophical disposition. In his most famous book
Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916, p. 91) recognised that the ‘scientific manage-
ment of work’ is often reduced only to considering the ‘efficiency in production’ –
much like we are witnessing in our time of evidence-based practices. However, Dewey
strongly claimed that workers, including teachers, are not to be reduced to a means only
in order to achieve the ends stipulated by an elite few. Rather, all participants, including
all teachers, should operate with a clear end in view. As educators we should all have
clearly articulated aims upon which our educational practices are to be informed. These
aims tend to be philosophical in nature but, as Dewey (1929, p. 29) has explained, there
is an important relationship between philosophy and science, and he argued that a
philosophy of education ‘enables practitioners to carry on their work in a more liberal
spirit, with escape from tradition and routine and one-sided personal interests and
whims’.
Nevertheless, having a philosophy of education, being philosophical, is directly
attacked by proponents of evidence-based research. Rather than being liberated through
engaging with philosophical thinking in order to enhance our scientific and critical
capacities, these proponents would rather us simply ‘apply’ what they regard to be the
self-evident rules of practice that somehow emerge from some simple empirical obser-
vations. Oancea and Pring (2008, p. 25) have clearly identified that ‘the philosophical
spirit is lacking’ in much of the evidence-based research. However, in addition to this
absence there are occasions when there are direct attacks against such a philosophical
approach. For example, in the book How People Learn (which is a major reference for
the Victorian government’s Department of Education) Bransford, Brown and Cocking
(2000) write quite disparagingly about philosophy, describing it as being mere ‘speculation’
and contrasting it with their own rather positivistic approaches to psychology as being
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‘scientific’. Also, Professor Gordon Stanley, the former president of the NSW Board of
Studies, recently stated that:
The people most opposed to the collection of evidence hold a strong philosophical position,
and they’re not interested in any changes to that position . . . It’s unfortunate if you just want
to have debates about philosophical positions without coming down to an analysis of what the
implications of these are for learning. When you are focused on evidence-based practice, you
keep focus on the question of what really works instead of having a debate about the philosophy
you hold. (As quoted by Ferrari (2008))
This view of Professor Stanley’s is most problematic because he attempts to dichot-
omise between ‘evidence’ and philosophy. Although some of us agree that it would be dif-
ficult to debate with anyone who holds a strong philosophical (and ideological) position
and also ‘who [is] not interested in any changes to that position’ because this would basi-
cally describe them as being closed minded and dogmatic, Professor Stanley clearly fails
to understand that the recognition and interpretation of ‘evidence’ is only possible through
a philosophical understanding. At first there must exist a framework of understanding that
values certain observations as being of importance for a particular interest. This has been
argued clearly by Putnam (2002, p. 135), who explains that through Dewey ‘value is
something that has to do with all of experience’. Consequently, we can appreciate that
facts, evidence, values and philosophy all operate concurrently when human persons are
researching, interpreting and making sense of phenomena.
However, Biesta (2007, p. 4) argues that the push from authorities to promote evidence-
based research adopts mostly positivistic assumptions towards evidence and actively hides
‘the crucial role of values’. He goes on to argue that:
Evidence-based practice provides a framework for understanding the role of research in edu-
cational practice that not only restricts the scope of decision making to questions about effec-
tivity and effectiveness but that also restricts the opportunities for participation in educational
decision making . . . [E]ducation is a thoroughly moral and political practice, one that needs to
be subject to continuous democratic contestation and deliberation. From this point of view an
exclusive emphasis on ‘what works’ will simply not work. (Biesta, 2007, p. 6)
This is also understood by Armstrong (2006, p. 3), who warns us that ‘“evidence”
actually becomes dangerous’ when it is consciously employed to curtail democratic delib-
erations regarding value and morality. The inextricable relation between education and
moral philosophy regarding what is worthwhile and what it is good for persons to become
or to be enables us to engage with the why questions of education in addition to the how.
However, proponents of evidence-based policies tend to renounce philosophical debate
and claim that the only concern that we should busy ourselves about is to consider the
evidence that demonstrates ‘what works’.
As educators, we are being prevented from deliberating about the ends and purposes of
such policies, and about education in general, as this would require us to be philosophical
and having the freedom to inquire. Totally absent from the policies and procedures to
emerge in this era of evidence-based practices are any clearly articulated understandings
regarding the end purposes of education and what might be understood to be the ‘good’ of
education, especially the public good from a global perspective. Such concerns have
always been intrinsic to education, especially through philosophy of education and
through the stated ‘aims’ or ‘purposes’ of education. However, these are entirely absent in
government literature regarding education and are becoming increasingly rare in teacher
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pre-service programs. Statements made in government literature assume a connection
between training in schools and the nation’s competitive economic potential. However,
this cause–effect relation has never actually been demonstrated to exist.
We are able to perceive that education itself, with its discourse on personhood, worth-
whileness, the good and the public, too, is entirely absent from the debates regarding evidence-
based research on ‘what works’. Such end purposes cannot be separated from the means of
attaining them. Policies regarding evidence-based practices often attempt to drive such a
divide by offering the end purposes of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ as if these were
self-evident goods. They do not offer meaningful end purposes for adopting the practices
that they promote, especially on educational grounds. Indeed, in the United Kingdom,
when the New Labour government came to power in 1997 their ‘Manifesto endorsed the
idea of a clear-cut separation between aims and ends in policy formation and implementa-
tion’ (Oancea & Pring, 2008, p. 16). Such bureaucratic approaches fail to acknowledge
that the means of educative teaching must be necessarily intrinsically embedded in the
philosophical ends or aims of education (Egan, 2005). As educators, we must actively sit-
uate the debate within education and its discourse and challenge technocratic approaches
promoting ‘best practices’ assumedly based upon evidence because these are without edu-
cative end purposes. They are equally applicable for promoting efficient and effective
forms of indoctrination because they only draw upon the discourse of management. In
order to make this challenge we must have a clear understanding of the logic of the dis-
course of education which requires us to have philosophically articulated aims of education
enabling us to direct our scientific inquiries. As Dewey (2001, p. 392) warned us, ‘lacking
a philosophy of unity, we have no basis upon which to make connections and our whole
treatment becomes piecemeal, empirical and at the mercy of external circumstances’. We
must come to appreciate why we should actively resist policies that are bureaucratically
driven and which can only justify themselves on the basis of evidence and managerial
efficiency that is merely empirical and clearly not scientific.
As practising educators, if we fail to locate the debate surrounding evidence-based
practice in the discourse of education, with its intrinsic moral and political aspects, and if
we fail to understand the difference between empirical and scientifically generated evid-
ence, we may well be manipulated out of the debate and out of conducting inquiries alto-
gether. Biesta (2007) warns that if we are to participate in the debate then we must strive
to locate it within education, thus making it more democratic. In such a context, the moral
and political aspects will be made visible and not remain hidden behind an assumed values-
neutral technical issue, as is currently the case. This can be made possible by continually
making it a priority to deliberate on the aims and purposes of education, in open forums.
As Biesta (2007, p. 18) contends, ‘a democratic society is precisely one in which the pur-
pose of education is not given but is a constant topic for discussion and deliberation’. Such
open discussion will assist us in remaining mindful of the intrinsically moral and political
aspects that must be central to all debates regarding education. Without these aspects
notions of effective learning and teaching become something other than educative.
If proponents of evidence-based practices make a claim that they have discovered evid-
ence regarding ‘what works’, then they simultaneously make the claim that this evidence is
good, valuable and worthwhile for human persons to experience. These claims should be
challenged on the grounds of their claim to being worthwhile educationally rather than sup-
pose that they have discovered a ‘real fact’ that necessitates a particular rule, procedure or
practice to be employed. We should call such studies to account by requiring that the propo-
nents of them articulate their end purposes and the goals of their proposed policies and enter
into debate regarding their educative value. These should be challenged beyond the mere
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efficiency of a narrowed skills development approach, which is often taken out of context of
the lived experiences of learners, and required to explain how such efficient means are both
good for the individuals and their personhood and for society on a global scale. Dewey
warns against a narrowing of concerns regarding specific skills development by asking:
How far is education a matter of forming specific skills and acquiring specific bodies of
information which are capable of isolated treatment? It is no answer to say that a human being
is always occupied in acquiring a special skill or a special body of facts, if he is learning any-
thing at all. This is true. But the educational issue is what other things in the way of desire,
tastes, aversions, abilities and disabilities he is learning along with his specific acquisitions.
(Dewey, 1929, p. 33)
This educational issue here is also related to his ‘collateral learning’, which he
described as the ‘enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes’ and contended is often ‘much
more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history’ (Dewey, 1938b,
p. 48). We would do well to take note of this and challenge such evidence-based studies
which recommend one singular way of learning how to read for all children in all circum-
stances, and to consider what sort of persons they become as a result of being exposed to
such procedures. Do they develop the most important attitude, which, according to Dewey
(1938b, p. 48), is the ‘desire to go on learning’?
Both Biesta and Dewey have highlighted the necessity to keep both the means and
ends together, and not allow them to become separated and manipulated for some presum-
ably value-neutral technical agenda. Biesta states that:
Sanderson therefore concludes that ‘the question for teachers is not simply “[W]hat is effective?”
[B]ut rather, more broadly, it is “[W]hat is appropriate for these children in these circum-
stances?”’ To suggest that research about ‘what works’ can replace normative professional
judgement is not only to make an unwarranted leap from ‘is’ to ‘ought’; it is also to deny edu-
cational practitioners the right not to act according to evidence about ‘what works’ if they
judge that such a line of action would be educationally undesirable. (Biesta, 2007, p. 11)
Biesta (2007, p. 11) recommends we turn to Dewey, who, in his view, ‘has developed one
of the most powerful and sophisticated “practical epistemologies” available in Western
philosophy’. Dewey himself has argued for the importance of educators to be actively involved
in determining what is to be their own best practices and not to passively accept policies in the
form of dogma from social elites. It is worth quoting him at length on this as he states:
The assumption that gives rise to the procedures just criticized is the belief that social conditions
determine educational objectives. This is a fallacy. Education is autonomous and should be
free to determine its own ends, its own objectives . . . Until educators get the independence
and courage to insist that educational aims are to be formed as well as executed within the
educative process, they will not come to consciousness of their own function . . . For education
is itself a process of discovering what values are worth while and are to be pursued as objectives.
(Dewey, 1929, p. 38)
Biesta, quite correctly, recognises in Dewey’s work that we need to be wary of any
procedures that are advertised as ‘what works’. At best, such recommendations can only
report historically what appears to have worked in the past in particular contexts and it is a
fallacy of logic to extrapolate rules and procedures for future contexts from these. This is
why Biesta (2007, p. 18) concludes that if we are indeed to live our democracy then as
professional educators, we need to be in constant ‘discussion and deliberation’ regarding
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purposes of educational practices because the concerns for particular persons as learners
must be involved, as the intrinsic moral aspect of educational discourse requires this. The
current bureaucratic agenda behind evidence-based education stifles such democratic
deliberation by attempting to lead the debate to focus exclusively upon only the applica-
tions of technical methods that ‘work’.
It is only possible to interpret and make sense of experiences in light of one’s overall
understanding of the end purposes for seeking facts and evidence. Such an overall under-
standing is philosophical in nature as it addresses the aims and purposes of the enterprise
of education itself and it is able to be made more intelligent through the development of a
scientific attitude. According to Dewey (1929):
Education is a mode of life, of action. As an act it is wider than science. The latter, however,
renders those who engage in the act more intelligent, more thoughtful, more aware of what
they are about, and thus able to rectify and enrich in the future what they have been doing in
the past . . . [It] may render educators more circumspect, more critical, as to what they are
doing. It may inspire better insight into what is going on . . .’ (p. 39)
There is great opportunity for us as educators to challenge governmental and bureaucratic
attempts to control our work through imposing policies that prescribe what methods and mod-
els of teaching we are to employ. We can challenge these by transcending the discourse of
management, which focuses only upon very narrow considerations of efficiencies, and locat-
ing the debate firmly within the discourse of education. It is here that the bigger picture issues
of what is morally good and worthwhile is to be debated regarding the aims and purposes of
education. These cannot be universally ‘answered’ but must be asked, considered, debated
and negotiated anew for each and every learning situation we encounter. This is why profes-
sional educators require a democratic environment in which to operate, providing us with the
freedom to critique and test suggestions in order to provide the greatest educative value for
our students. But this is risky work, as Armstrong (2006) identifies. He argues that ‘to be crit-
ical is to take risks; it entails asking questions about whose interests are served by particular
ways of conceptualising educational value and practice’ (p. 9). Nevertheless, we can do this
more intelligently if we become more scientific in our attitude rather than just empirical, and
locate our practices firmly within the discourse of education.
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